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overlooked in most of the older cases but many of the more recent decisions
have considered and given effect to them. It would be interesting to note
the outcome of a case in which both these statutes and the doctrine of the
theory of the case were properly urged. The situation at present seems
to be that whichever of these positions is brought to the attention of the
court is the one that controls its decision while the other is apparently not
considered. This probably accounts for the result reached in the principal
case.
It is again suggested that were the court forced to choose between the
aforementioned statutes and the doctrine of the theory of the case the
former might easily be held to prevail and the latter which has been the
butt of much criticism in recent years might definitely be repudiated. Here
is a situation in which certainty as to what the law is is of vast importance.
Whatever the final choice between the two competing rules, it seems highly
desirable that the law in Indiana be made clear to the profession once and
for all.
S. J.S.
WRIT OF CORAM NoBIs-DOUBLE JEOPARDY LIMITATIONS-Juan S. Lopez,

convicted on a criminal charge inthe Lake County Criminal Court, paid
his fine and served his sentence. Then he sought to obtain another trial, an
acquittal in which would both save him from deportation based on the conviction and free him of the stigma cast by it upon his reputation. When he
presented his petition to the aforementioned court for a writ of error
coram nobis, the court refused him permission to file the petition; and he
applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandate ordering the lower
court to let him file. Held, for petitioner. The writ of error coram nobis
is analogous to a new trial; in both types of procedure double jeopardy is
waived. State ex rel Lopez v. Killigrew and Smith, Supreme Court of
Indiana, February 20, 1931, 174 N. E. 808.
Jeopardy is held in most jurisdictions to begin when a jury is properly
impaneled and sworn in by a court of jurisdiction to try the defendant upon
an indictment duly found and formally adequate to sustain a conviction,
though things may happen during the course of the trial which will leave
the defendant subject to a trial before a new jury. People ex rel Stabile v.
Warden of City Prison of New York, 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 729 (1911);
People ex rel Bullock v. Hayes, 151 N. Y. S. 1075, 109 N. E. 77 (1915).
Jeopardy does not attach in Indiana until the accused is put upon trial on
a legal indictment before a competent jury and a court of jurisdiction.
Klein vState, 151 Ind. 146; Warden v. Emmons, 83 Ind. 331. Conditions
subsequent, as it were, which may occur during trial and will terminate the
privilege of pleading double jeolardy in anothei trial for the same offense
include failure of jurors to agree (White v. State, 63 Fla. 49, 59 So. 17
(1912]); proper discharge of jury for inability to agree (People ex rel
Bullock supra; State v. Leach, 180 Ind. 124); withdrawal of case from jury
after discovering, following the swearing in, that one is disqualified (Mimyard v. State, 17 Ga. App. 398, 87 S. E. 710 [1916]); Adams v. State, 99
Ind. 244); discharge of jury on defendant's objection because of court's
failure to admonish them before separation (State v. McKinney, 76 Kan.
419, 91 P. 1068-1907). And, though statutory regulations in some states
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modify the rule, there is great uniformity of decisions that reversal of
judgment is a bar to the plea of former jeopardy.
One may be tried, convicted, and punished by both the state and Federal governments on the same set of facts involving violation of laws of
both governments, the offenses being separate in legal contemplation; and
double jeopardy does not occur. So may one be tried and punished for
contempt for violating an injunction and again for violating a criminal
law, though both arise from the same act. State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co.,
102 Minn. 470, 113 N. W. 634 (1910); Ex Parte Roper, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 68,
134 S. W. 334. For protection against double jeopardy is limited to criminal prosecutions. State v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55, 2 N. E. 214. No jeopardy
attaches to a trial in the wrong jurisdiction, and a second trial in the vicinage of the crime involves no double jeopardy. 8 R. C. L. 137-138.
While a legal acquittal will bar a second trial for the same offense, a
trial may be granted the accused on his own motion. Ezzard v. State, 11
Ga. App. 30, 74 S. E. 551. But "in considering the identity of the offense,
it must appear by the plea that the offense charged in both cases is the
same in law and in fact." Shaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick
(Mass.) 496. The same transaction may result in two similar offenses-A
may murder two people at the same time and by the same act-and acquittal for one is no bar to prosecution for the other, the theory being that
there are two distinct crimes. Augustine v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 59, 52
S. W. 77. That identity of transactionsor acts is the controlling consideration in determining double jeopardy is the rule in a great majority of the
cases.
And the crime must either be the same in fact or be necessarily included
in the former. State v. Day, 5 Pen. (Del.) 101, 58 Atl. 946. For when
the facts necessary to convict on a second prosecution would not necessarily
have convicted on the first, then the first prosecution will not be a bar to
the second. Miller v. State, 33 Ind. App. 509, 71 N. E. 248. But if the
facts requisite to conviction on the second prosecution would necessarily
have convicted on the first, then, on grounds of double jeopardy, final judgment in the first will bar another prosecution. State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282.
Where a person is brought to trial and jeopardy attaches, he cannot thereafter be tried for a greater offense arising out of the same criminal act,
unless there was fraud, connivance, or collusion in obtaining the results of
the first trial. State v. Elder, supra. So, if one is tried for assault, he
cannot thereafter be tried on the same set of facts for assault with intent
to rape. And the same rule applies where the first trial is for the greater
instead of the lesser crime: the accused cannot thereafter be tried for the
lesser offense necessarily included in the greater.
But if, after conviction, a new fact arises from the same set of facts,
so that a new set of facts results, the combination of the same facts plus
the newly developed fact or facts will support a trial for a different crime.
Thus, a conviction for assault while the victim is living will not bar a trial
for his murder after his death caused by the same act of assault, the theory
here being that a new fact-the death-has intervened, changed the character of the crime, and constituted a distinctly new one. Diaz v. United
States, 223 U. S. 442. Logically, therefore, although a strong argument
to the contrary may be founded on the theory of dissimilarity of the crimes
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and intervention of the entirely new fact of death (14 L. R. A. (new
series) 210), an acquittal of assault should bar a subsequent prosecution
for murder based on the same facts, for, assault being a requisite element of
murder, and defendant being proved not guilty of assault, it is difficult to
understand how, under the rules announced in the preceding paragraph, the
same assault could be made an issue a second time.
Waiver of double jeopardy protection can be effected in many ways. It
is found in the arresting of judgment on motion of the prisoner, or in
vacating the same on his motion; and he cannot thereafter plead the former jeopardy in bar to a subsequent indictment or trial. People v. Ham
Tong, 155 Cal. 579, 102 P. 263 (1909); People v. Zlatincke, 152 Ill. App.
363 (1910). The constitutional immunity from second jeopardy is a personal privilege, which may be waived; the waiver may be either express
or implied; and it is always implied when there is a failure to raise objections at the first opportunity-objections come too late for example when
raised for the first time on a motion in arrest of judgment. Levin v.
United States, 5 F. (2nd) 598. Some of the cases reveal a careless use of
the term right by the courts in connection with protection against double
jeopardy. But whatever name be applied, the concept continues unchanged
in legal contemplation; and the fact remains that the protection can be
waived expressly or impliedly. Apparently the general rule is that a
tardy objection to double jeopardy is an implied waiver. What the real
reason for the rule is, the books do not disclose. It may be punitive so as
to discourage the strategic shift of waiting until the trial is finished and
then setting at naught the expensive judicial procedure by calling up the
plea of former jeopardy. Or it may be merely to prevent the defendant
from "sleeping on his rights" and complaining after he awakens to a
world too full of justice for his tastes.
Where the accused consented to the discharge of the jury after the
trial had begun, in order that he might withdraw his plea of not guilty
and demur to the indictment, he thereby waived the former jeopardy.
People v. Nash, 15 Cal. App. 320, 114 P. 784. Application for a new trial
is a waiver of double jeopardy, and is suing out a writ of error and obtaining a reversal. State v. B-,
173 Wis. 608, 182 N. W. 474 (1921); People v. Fochtnan, 226 Mich. 53, 197 N. W. 166; Watson v. State, 224 P. 368
(Okl. Cr. App. 1924).
Two conclusions may be reached from the foregoing discussion. First,
the principal case was correctly decided; under such facts as it presented,
double jeopardy and all its consequences can be completely obviated. Second, three legal forces-limitation of conditions on which jeopardy may
arise, recognition of the manifold conditions which terminate it after it
has once come into existence, and the readiness with which a waiver of it is
found by the courts-all tend to press in upon the constitutional protection
and to restrict its successful employment as a defense to a relatively small
number of situations.
H. W. J.

